In Defense of the Objective Epistemic Approach to Argumentation

John Biro, Harvey Siegel

Abstract


In this paper we defend a particular version of the epistemic approach to argumentation. We advance some general considerations in favor of the approach and then examine the ways in which different versions of it play out with respect to the theory of fallacies, which we see as central to an understanding of argumentation. Epistemic theories divide into objective and subjective versions. We argue in favor of the objective version, showing that it provides a better account than its subjectivist rival of the central fallacy of begging the question. We suggest that the strengths of the objective epistemic theory of fallacies provide support for the epistemic approach to argumentation more generally.

Keywords


Arguing, argument, argumentation, begging the question, epistemic theories, fallacies, objective epistemic theories, persuasion, subjective, subjective epistemic theories

Full Text:

PDF


DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v26i1.432

ISSN: 0824-2577