Argument Schemes from the Point of View of Hamblin’s Dialectic

Jan A. van Laar

Abstract


This paper aims at a normative account of non-deductive argumentation schemes in the spirit of Hamblin’s dialectical philosophy. First, three principles are presented that characterize Hamblin’s dialectical stance. Second, argumentation schemes, which have hardly been examined in Hamblin’s book Fallacies, shall be dealt with by applying these principles, taking an argumentation scheme from authority as the leading example. Third, a formal dialectical system, along the lines indicated by Hamblin, shall be developed that includes norms for using argumentation schemes and norms for responding to arguments that are presented as instantiating acceptable argumentation schemes.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v31i4.3363

ISSN: 0824-2577