Critical Thinking In Moral Argumentation Contexts: A Virtue Ethical Approach

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Abstract: Michael Gilbert argues that Cartesian reasoning defined as rational, linear thought processes preclusive of emotions, intuitions and lived experience, i.e. “Natural Light Theory” (NLT), fails because it arbitrarily excludes standard feminine forms of reasoning and neglects the essentially social nature of argumentation. In this paper, I supplement Gilbert’s view by showing that NLT fails in a distinctive manner in moral argumentation contexts. Specifically, by requiring arguers to value truth and justice above their relationship with their argumentative partner, it tends to alienate the arguer from her moral motives, engendering a kind of moral schizophrenia.

Résumé: Michael Gilbert soutient que le raisonnement cartésien défini comme un processus de pensée rationnel linéaire qui exclut les émotions, les intuitions et les expériences vécues, c'est à dire une «théorie de la lumière naturelle» (TLN), échoue, car il exclut arbitrairement les formes normales de raisonnement féminin et il néglige la nature essentiellement sociale de l'argumentation. Dans cet article, je complète ce point de vue de Gilbert en montrant que la TLN échoue d'une façon distinctive dans des contexts d'argumentation morale. Plus précisément, en exigeant des raisonneurs à valoriser la vérité et de la justice au-dessus de leur relation avec leur partenaire argumentatif, il tend à aliéner un raisonneur de ses motifs moraux, ce qui engendre en lui une sorte de schizophrénie morale.

Keywords: argumentation; critical thinking; epistemic virtue; virtue ethics

1. Introduction

In traditional analytic philosophy, critical thinking is typically defined along Cartesian lines as rational and linear thought processes, preclusive of intuitions, emotions and lived experience. This definition is rooted in Aristotelian syllogistic logic and Fregean logic characterized by inference rules and binary
truth values. Michael Gilbert (1994; 1996; 1997) describes this type of approach, which “appeals exclusively to reason, logic and the mind,” as “The Natural Light Theory” (NLT) (1994, p. 95). NLT, he says, holds that, *ceteris paribus*, “competing theories that clash in the arena of reason result in the truer (or better) emerging victorious” (1994, p. 109). However, this view, though “dominant” in academic philosophy, is false and misleading: “false because too many false theories have survived (and still survive) far too long”; and misleading because “too much is carried in the *ceteris paribus* clause” (1994, p. 109). In this vein, NLT has failed abysmally to eradicate racism, sexism and colonialism, even in the fastidious annals of academic philosophy. It is well known, for instance, that Heidegger, Schopenhauer, and Locke—in spite of their significant accomplishments in theoretical philosophy—endorsed Nazism, misogyny, and English colonialism, respectively, as a matter of moral practice. And more recently, Janice Raymond, who has shown incisive reasoning in some of her feminist critiques—for instance, *A Passion for Friends: A Philosophy of Female Friendship* (1986)—has been judiciously criticized (Riddell 2006; Whittle 2000) for promoting transphobia elsewhere.¹ This shows that expert critical thinking skills do not suffice to safeguard one against the false and prejudiced assumptions of one’s place and time.

For the most part I agree with Gilbert’s criticism, but I do not think that it completely captures NLT’s shortcomings. While it is true that NLT fails in critical thinking contexts in general, I believe that it fails in a distinctive and particularly acute manner in moral reasoning contexts. In this paper, I aim to clarify and expand upon Gilbert’s criticism of NLT by investigating critical thinking in moral argumentation. I shall argue that in these contexts, virtuous motives should take precedence over impartial standards of analytic rationality. In particular, critical thinkers should be moved first and foremost by “internal” motives of love, affection, friendship, and fellow-feeling, and only secondarily by “external” motives such as a commitment to truth or justice or a sense of duty.

¹ Carol Riddell for one points out that Raymond’s method in *The Transsexual Empire* (1979) consists of defining transsexual women as not-women and transsexual men as not-men, and this “makes criticism impossible” and invalidates objections “from the start” (p. 150). This *a priori* approach to transsexuality is a form of prejudice and anathema to critical thinking.
2. Coalescent argumentation

To begin with, it is necessary to understand Gilbert’s theory, upon which mine will build. In “Goals in Argumentation” (1996), Gilbert delineates three goals that underlie every persuasive interaction:

1. “task goals,” which form the immediate strategic object of the communication.
2. “face goals,” which concern the relationship between the arguers.
3. “motives,” which “determine task and face goals in a broad and general way” (224)

Gilbert notes that although goals and motives are complex, elusive and often hidden, if caution is used, “one can make judgments concerning the goals of the participants” fairly accurately (1996, 227). To illustrate, he gives the following example:

Jim and Richard are arguing about who has done more of the food shopping. Jim insists that he has done far more than Richard. Richard replies that Jim does not mind the chore nearly as much as he, Richard, does. Jim makes one of the following replies:

(A) That doesn’t matter. We each do things we don’t enjoy. It’s your turn now.
(B) I know that; but what will you do to even things up if I food shop all the time?
(C) Well, has it occurred to you that asking me nicely instead of pretending you do as much as I do might work better? (1996, 227).

In each of these responses, we can discern a different primary goal or motive. In (A) it is the task goal of avoiding doing the shopping; in (B) it appears to be the face goal of seeking redress from Richard for Jim’s frequent shopping; and in (C) it is the motive of persuading Richard to adopt a motive of Jim’s—that of being polite.

Gilbert argues that identifying goals and motives is crucial to achieving a coalescent conclusion, which is the aim of argumentation. The coalescent approach is subject to two NLT-type criticisms: (1) In treating all arguments as negotiations, it ignores the role of truth; and (2) It ignores the role of normative factors such as justice, fairness, rightness, and so on. To these criticisms, Gilbert responds that while truth and normative factors such as justice might be “highly prioritized motives of both parties” (1996, 229), they should not be deemed the exclusive goals of argumentation, since this narrow Cartesian focus arbi-
trarily excludes feminist forms of argumentation and neglects the essentially social nature of dissuasive discourse. More specifically, Gilbert notes that NLT marginalizes “female modes of reasoning” (1994, 99), which, according to feminist philosophy, rely on “responsibility, trust, and a finely tuned intuitive capacity” (Code 1991), are relational and consensually oriented (Gilgian 1982), and aim at “establishing intimacy” through “the telling of details” and personal narratives (Tannen 1984, 115). Whether “female” reasoning is essential or culturally constructed, the fact that it is the preferred mode of reasoning amongst most women (and very many men) suffices to show that the official dominance of NLT is oppressive. By ‘dominant,’ Gilbert means official, institutionally entrenched and disproportionately socially valued. He writes, “when women’s techniques are used, they can easily be stifled by a comment such as, ‘That’s all very interesting, but can we please keep to the facts (or issues or problem or agenda)?’ This is what I mean by dominant” (1997, 51). Thus, although feminine reasoning may be more prevalent in deliberative and conversational practice, NLT’s hegemonic force subordinates and marginalizes this type of reasoning across a vast range of social contexts. This is how NLT manages to silence women’s voices and exclude them from serious discourse.

I wish to modify this account to say not only that truth and normative factors such as justice should not be the exclusive goals of argumentation, but that they should not be the primary motives in an agent’s moral deliberation, supplying her with immediate reasons to make certain argumentative moves. However, I do not wish to rule out their possible inclusion as secondary motives, providing limiting conditions on what may be done from other motives. I hold this view because acting on “external” (non-moral) motives threatens to engender a kind of moral schizophrenia and to alienate the agent from her argumentative partner.

3. Moral versus non-moral reasoning

It should be fairly uncontroversial that there is a significant difference between moral and non-moral reasoning, but in case there is any doubt, simply consider the following two questions: (a) Is $\pi$ squared 9.86 or 9.87?, and (b) Is abortion morally permissible? Typically the first type of question (mathematical) will elicit a fairly dispassionate response, while the second type (moral) will provoke a stronger emotional reaction, which in turn may generate discord and hostility if met with dissent from
Socrates: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger? Let us look at it this way. If you and I were to differ about numbers as to which is the greater, would this difference make us enemies and angry with each other, or would we proceed to count and soon resolve our differences about this?

Euthyphro: We would certainly do so.

Socrates: And about the heavier and the lighter, we would resort to weighing and being reconciled?

Euthyphro: Of course.

Socrates: What subject of difference would make us angry and hostile to each other if we were unable to come to a decision? Perhaps you do not have an answer ready, but examine as I tell you whether these subjects are the just and the unjust, the good and the bad. Are these not the subjects of difference about which, when we are unable to come to a satisfactory decision, you and I and other men become hostile to each other whenever we do? (Plato 1981, 11).

Duck-Joo Kwak cites this passage to illustrate that moral argumentation “is usually incapable of rational settlement” (2007, 464). However, the possibility of resolution is enhanced if arguers employ not only “epistemic criteria,” such as avoiding logical fallacies, but also “epistemic virtues,” such as being open-minded, being fair-minded, being willing to listen to others, and so on. Epistemic criteria, on Kwak’s account, are “external to oneself, i.e. to one’s beliefs and desires” (462). They require one to “step back” from one’s position and evaluate it in light of impartial standards of rationality. By contrast, epistemic virtues are “internal to oneself,” in that they are “related to one’s sense of self or integrity” (465). These two approaches are important, says Kwak, because they permit us to strike the right balance between “learned ownership” of our moral ideals (467), and respect for “the respective concerns of both sides.” (461). This helps us to reach a resolution that is fair and acceptable to all concerned.

In a similar vein, I wish to suggest that moral motives are “internal” to oneself while non-moral motives are “external,” and that acting on moral/internal motives in moral contexts (for instance, in helping a friend or arguing about abortion) is crucial to establishing a coherent sense of self, while acting from normative commitments—justice, duty, and so on—can be alienat-
ing. However, like Kwak, I think that “external” reasons may play an important role in moral deliberation: namely, they may provide limiting conditions on what may be done from other motives, though they should not—unless moral motives are lacking—serve as primary movers. I shall provide evidence for this in what follows. First, however, it is necessary for me to demonstrate the special connection between critical thinking and moral argumentation which renders NLT particularly problematic for this type of context.

As we saw, NLT requires that we intellectually step back from our position and evaluate it in light of impartial standards of rationality, thereby setting aside our naturally occurring feelings about that position and its consequences. This presents special problems in the domain of moral argumentation because moral reasoning by definition concerns the problem of how we should live in relation to others—a matter of particular importance to us as human beings. Adopting a fully impartial perspective in moral reasoning, then, threatens to undermine agent-relative considerations that arise out of our humanity and are relevant to moral decision-making. This type of consideration prompts William Hare (1981) to say, “The problem [with emotional detachment] is that a commitment to a rational approach may drive out that emotional response which is so important a part of a fully human involvement in morality. We can think, for instance, of Euthyphro’s disturbing indifference to the fact that it is his own father he is prepared to prosecute” (126). Another example is the case of Stalin and Hitler, who, according to Colbeck, “did not need to think harder, but to feel differently about people” (1980, 63, as quoted in Hare, 126). This type of detachment is not particularly vexing when we are trying to solve a mathematical problem or to fix a carburetor, but when we are trying to decide how to live in relation to others, it can undermine a “fully human involvement” in our moral agency and relation to others.

Hare gives us a second, independent reason for eschewing emotional detachment in moral reasoning: namely, that although “our feelings can lead us astray,” they are typically “needed to balance one’s judgment” and arrive at adequate conclusions (126). This is because emotionality is needed to perceive the relevance of moral considerations. Hare illustrates this through a number of examples, the most persuasive of which I take to be the following: (i) a “fanatic” (i.e. a perfectly rational, but emotionally detached individual) may think only about the consequences of his actions and not about “his own feelings”, in which case he is “not taking all of the relevant factors into account” – specifically, he is not struck by the feelings of disgust the situation warrants (126); (ii) He may recognize these factors,
but still not be moved by them—that is, he may be thinking “critically about morals,” even though he is “committed to no moral principles” (127); (iii) He may be unable to apply the principle of universalisability, because he is unable to ask himself how he would feel if others treated him as he treats other people; (iv) He cannot consider whether certain feelings rather than others are called for in certain situations, which rules out potentially-relevant considerations a priori and without rational support. Hence, contrary to the traditional Cartesian view which valorizes the application of pure reason, it turns out that the “fanatic,” by virtue of being cut off from his emotional self, is intellectually handicapped when it comes to critical thinking. This counts against NLT’s claim to deliver the truth through rational criticism alone: if Hare is right, rationality needs to be balanced against emotionality in order for critical thinking to yield the right kinds of answers.

It is worth noting here that these considerations provide us with a response to the two NLT-type criticisms raised against coalescent argumentation, i.e., that (1) it ignores the role of truth, and (2) it ignores the role of normative factors such as justice, fairness, rightness, and so on. On Hare’s account, (1) emotional attachment, including attention to face goals, is better suited than rational assessment alone for critically evaluating moral problems, and (2) emotional attachment does not ignore the role of normative factors, but rather balances them against other relevant considerations. Hare’s account also rebukes the fear of relativism, inasmuch as it shows affective elements to contribute to effective critical thinking.

This establishes a crucial link between emotionality and moral reasoning: emotionality is essential to moral reasoning because it preserves our “fully human investment” in issues that matter to us as moral agents, and it is required to deliberate accurately about such issues. In the next section, I shall argue that emotions should play not only a crucial role, but a dominant role, trumping other kinds of motives in moral argumentation.

4. Moral schizophrenia, alienation and the Kantian challenge

My position is not simply that moral motives typically take precedence over scientific motives as a matter of descriptive moral psychology, but that they should trump scientific motives in one’s motivational set, for the sake of protecting one’s moral integrity and character. In this section, I shall defend this claim. My heuristic preference is to use familiar examples from the ethics literature to test our theoretically-informed intuitions on
these matters. This approach allows me to make inroads into the debate as it now stands.

To begin, then, consider the following set of examples, inspired by Julia Driver’s virtue ethical treatment of Huckleberry Finn.

(1) In Mark Twain’s *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, Huck helps his friend Jim escape from slavery in pre-Civil War Missouri, even though he does not believe that the institution of slavery is wrong. As Julia Driver points out (2001), Huck believes that he is “a party to theft,” and that what he is doing is “dishonest and ungrateful”; but he helps Jim nonetheless because he considers him a friend (74). Driver says that Huck’s action is virtuous because it expresses a character trait that leads to good systematically, as per her consequentialist account. For my purposes, Huck is interesting for the structure of his motivational set. Although Huck believes that slavery is justified, his moral motives are virtuous – he is inclined to help his friend for the sake of friendship; and thus, because his moral motives trump his normative commitments vis-à-vis slavery, he is compelled to do the right thing. Moreover, although he is psychologically fragmented, he retains a fairly robust sense of self, which is evident at the end of the novel. There, even after he is caught, he defends Jim, saying that he “had a good heart in him and was a good man” (Twain 1885, 342), and does not regret his decision to help.

(2) Now consider a second scenario: Huck’s doppelganger, Huck2, believes that the institution of slavery is wrong, but he has no friendly feelings toward Jim. Huck2 helps Jim on account of his normative convictions vis-à-vis slavery, and thereby satisfies the relevant epistemic criteria (to use Kwak’s language) of acting on objectively correct reasons. But his helping action does not display epistemic virtue, as it does not stem from his own epistemic character, and in this sense it rings hollow. In other words, Huck2 follows the right deontic maxims, but not in the right spirit – the spirit of friendship, compassion and fellow feeling, which gives altruistic actions their special sheen, as it were. I shall say more in defense of this view shortly.

(3) In the third scenario, Huck’s second doppelganger, Huck3, believes that the institution of slavery is wrong, and he also cherishes Jim as a true friend. Huck3 helps Jim first and foremost for Jim’s sake, but secondarily (in an auxiliary or counterfactual fashion) due to normative convictions about the moral status of slavery. This is the ideal state of affairs, as
Huck3 manifests both the epistemic virtue and the moral integrity required for full-fledged flourishing as a human being.

Now to elaborate on (2), the type of disharmony displayed by Huck2 is described by Michael Stocker in a famous paper on modern ethical theories (1976) as “moral schizophrenia.” There, Stocker argues that modern duty-based or rule-based ethical theories necessitate a schizophrenia between reason [i.e. justification] and motive [i.e. love, friendship, affection, community] in vitally important and pervasive areas of value, or alternatively they allow us the harmony of a morally impoverished life, a life deeply deficient in what is valuable. It is not possible for moral people, that is, people who would achieve what is valuable, to act on these ethical theories, to let them compromise their motives. People who do let them compromise their motives will, for that reason, have a life seriously lacking in what is valuable. (455)

To bring this into relief, Stocker asks the reader to imagine that she is sick in the hospital and has just received a visit from Smith. You, the convalescent, are convinced that Smith is a fine friend, but when you compliment him on his solicitude, he responds that “he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what he thinks would be best” (462). After some prodding, you discover that he is completely serious—he has come to visit you not for your own sake or the sake of the friendship, but purely out of a sense of duty. “Surely,” Stocker says, “there is something lacking here, and lacking in moral merit or value” (462). It seems that Smith is not a fine friend after all, but rather a strict rule-worshipper, who would tend to a sick friend as readily as he would attend a political rally or a religious service.

Admittedly, this view does somewhat rely on the intuitive appeal of the intrinsic worth of virtuous motives, which could be seen as question-begging. But I take it that the intuition that we wish to be valued for our own sake (and not merely instrumentally for another’s end), and should treat others the same, is, if not universal, at least very widely shared. Secondly, I am not suggesting we should never act from duty, but only that duty is a second-best motive, to be utilized in case moral motives are lacking. (Obviously acting rightly from duty is better than acting in a wantonly wrongful manner when there is a choice between the two). And thirdly, although my view applies to all moral actions, it applies especially strongly to altruistic ones. In this connection, Lawrence Blum (1980) contends that while duty may account for a limited range of moral actions, it fails to explain...
altruistic ones, which stem from “the altruistic emotions”—
“sympathy, compassion and human concern” (1). These emo-
tions, he says, reflect a “direct” concern for the “weal and woe”
of other human beings, while duty aims at an intellectual ab-
straction (1). Thus, even if there is skepticism about the value of
virtuous motives in certain contexts, there should be more con-
fidence in contexts in which altruism is an issue—for instance,
in arguments about how we should treat others in need, which is
a fairly broad range. If we are arguing about homelessness, for
instance, there is intuitive force to the idea that the argument
should serve the homeless person’s needs for his sake, and not
for other, non-moral reasons that might reduce him to a mere
object of moral paternalism.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, there are strong and fami-
liar objections from the Kantian side that warrant a response. Un-
fortunately, I cannot respond to all of them in this short space,
but I shall address what I take to be the strongest and most ur-
gent among them.

Now, the Kantian literature is vast and there are many inter-
pretations of Kant’s account of moral worth, but the one that I
am interested in states that only actions motivated by a sense of
duty have genuine moral worth. To this effect, Kant writes in the
*Groundwork*,

> Now an action done from duty has to set aside altogether
> the influence of inclination, and along with inclination
> every object of the will; so there is nothing left able to
determine the will except objectively the law and subjec-
> tively pure reverence for this practical law, and ther-
> efore the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment
> of all my inclinations. (Groundwork, 400)

On this view, an action has moral worth if and only if it is done
from duty, or, to permit a more charitable interpretation of Kant,
“a person is morally worthy on an occasion if and only if she
has adopted the appropriate moral maxim” (Simmons, 88). That
is, a person is morally worthy if she has developed a disposition
to act dutifully, even if on a particular occasion it is impossible
for her to do so. So a person can be worthy even if she acts
wrongly.

The worry about this account is captured epigrammatically
in F. Schiller’s poetic joke about virtue: “Gladly I serve my
friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with
doubt that I am not a virtuous person” (Simmons, 85). In re-
sponse, Simmons states that an agent is morally worthy so long
as she has adopted the moral maxim, “whether or not there are
cooperating sufficient non-moral motives”; and thus “there is no
moral requirement that the agent rid herself of cooperating inclinations” (96). Hence she may be morally worthy and “happy in the performance of [her] duty” (97). But this does not quell the virtue ethicist’s concern, which is that the mediation of duty-based considerations cheapens the agent’s moral action, and potentially alienates her from the beneficiary of that action, in effect reducing that beneficiary to an object of moral paternalism.

Marcia Baron (1984) summarizes this concern—echoed by Stocker, B.A.O. Williams (1976) and S. Wolf (1982)—as the worry that “action done from duty expresses and perhaps nurtures the wrong sorts of attitudes toward others” (199), an attitude that is “alienating” and “morally repugnant” (201). But she points out that this worry can take different forms, depending on how one interprets Stocker’s example. Specifically, one might worry (a) that Smith is visiting his friend only grudgingly or reluctantly, which diminishes the friendship, (b) that he is visiting his friend sanctimoniously or smugly, which exemplifies a disturbing sense of moral self-satisfaction, or (c) that his preoccupation with duty will gradually deteriorate into a fetishistic obsession with duty, preventing him from valuing other morally relevant concerns. However, as Baron points out, none of these outcomes is inevitable, unless we imagine Smith thinking about the rightness of helping his friend just before acting, and then proceeding directly on this motive. If this is the case, then duty drives Smith to help his friend, alienating him from full-fledged friendship. In Baron’s words, “there are right times and there are wrong times for reflecting on the moral status of various forms of conduct, and the period immediately prior to action will frequently be one of the wrong times” (208). However, this does not mean that duty cannot play any role in moral deliberation:

First, my sense of duty may prompt me to help the person, and it may motivate me without the aid of inclination and possibly in the face of conflicting inclinations. Here, my sense of duty operates as a primary motive. But imagine instead that I want to help someone—for example, a student who is having trouble with an assignment—and do so in the conviction that I should help him (or, that I do not act wrongly in helping him). In this case, my sense of duty is a secondary motive. It tells me that I may or that I should act as I wished. (Baron, 207)

That is, if duty functions as a secondary motive, operationally constraining the motives available for practical deliberation, then it does not have the alienating effect that vexes virtue ethicists such as Stocker. However, it should be clear that while Baron’s account saves Kantianism from Stocker’s challenge, it does not count against the thesis of this paper; for my proposal
from the beginning has been not that duty should play no role in moral deliberation, but only that duty should not play a dominant, super-ordinate role. And this claim is compatible with Baron’s Kantian defense. Hence, Baron’s argument bolsters my virtue ethical approach, inasmuch as it undermines the traditional objection from duty.

It may also reflect favourably on my approach that it is compatible with several ethical theories, since our more deeply-entrenched moral intuitions tend to transcend theoretical frameworks. This is affirmed by David Boonin and Graham Oddie (2010), who point out that “in a large number of cases, the arguments that philosophers offer when they are working on problems in applied ethics are grounded in assumptions that no one would deny” (28), assumptions that, because universal, fit with a range of theories. For example, in Peter Singer’s famous article on famine relief (1972), he claims that it would be wrong not to save a drowning child in a nearby shallow pond. This claim is supported by consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics equally well. The fact that it is supported equally by all three theories testifies to its intuitive plausibility. Likewise, the fact that the idea that duty should not be super-ordinate is compatible with virtue ethics as well as deontology arguably testifies to its intuitive plausibility. Although it is not as undeniable as Singer’s claim, on close scrutiny, and in light of the example of the sick friend and the three cases of Huckleberry Finn, it appears to connect fairly closely with our folk intuitions.

5. Summary

Before proceeding, let us take inventory. Including my argument against the Kantian approach, there are three main reasons to oppose NLT: (1) it excludes non-logical modes of reasoning and debars women’s voices from institutional discourse; (2) it forestalls coalescence and reconciliation by neglecting the importance of face goals; and (3) it threatens to alienate people from their moral motives and their relationships with others. It is this third failing that accounts for NLT’s particular unsuitability in moral argumentation. In this section, let us assess these criticisms in more detail.

(1) Gilbert specifies that there are at least three non-logical modes of reasoning: (1) “The emotional, which relates to the realm of feelings,” (2) “the visceral, which stems from the area of the physical,” and (3) the kisceral (from the Japanese term ki meaning energy), which covers the intuitive and non-sensory arenas” (1997, p. 79). These modes occur frequently
in ordinary instances of dissuasive discourse in daily life. For example, if someone raises an argument against abortion to someone who is sensitive to this topic, she may begin to cry, and this “human emotional communication device” (1997, 83) is “clearly [a component] of the argument” (1997, 82). To deny this excludes a common dissuasive strategy. Similarly, a person might respond to an argument by rubbing her interlocutor’s shoulders to relieve tension and set the argument on a less adversarial path. Or a person might argue from an intuitive feeling whose grounds she cannot articulate. Seeing that we rely on these argumentative moves often—and that women in particular tend to appeal to them in argumentation (Gilligan 1982, Tannen 1990, Warren 1988)—excluding them will debar many people from institutional dialogue and debate. If Gilbert is right, this exclusion seriously impoverishes our collective discourse.

(2) Gilbert, Hare, Kwak and others have argued persuasively that ignoring face goals undermines the aim of reconciliation. The main reason is that paying attention to another’s face goals, while maintaining one’s own moral integrity, allows one to strike the right balance between respecting the other’s values and maintaining one’s own. On the other hand, ignoring face goals limits the resources available for strategic maneuvering (i.e. moving toward the best position in light of the argumentative circumstances), and also promotes an adversarial stance toward the other. If the relationship between the arguers is ignored, then even if both arguers are reasonable, there is a risk that neither will present arguments that are effective at persuading the other. If arguments are not remotely connected to the recipient’s frame of reference, they will not have any persuasive force and the arguers will come to a stalemate.

(3) The alienating effect of NLT can be illustrated by analogy with Stocker’s example of the sick friend. On Baron’s account, Smith’s attitude toward his sick “friend” may show that he is lacking in moral merit or value if (a) he is visiting his friend only grudgingly or reluctantly, (b) he is visiting his friend sanctimoniously or smugly, or (c) he is so preoccupied with duty that he is unable to value other morally relevant concerns. Analogously, there is a worry that the NLT-style arguer is likely to approach argumentation in a manner that is (a) grudging or reluctant—say, if he believes it is his duty to “enlighten” his ignorant audience, (b) sanctimonious or smug—for instance, if he is reveling in his own perceived sense of intellectual superiority; or else (c) he may be so pre-
occupied with non-moral motives that he cannot appreciate other morally relevant considerations (as per Hare’s argument). In effect, insofar as the arguer subordinates face goals to other motives, he is unlikely to approach the dissuasive encounter with an attitude of cooperation and respect. But, as Moulton points out, the “adversarial method” reflected in this attitude constrains critical thinking into an oppositional mode of reasoning and “creates conditions of hostility [that] are not likely to elicit the best reasoning” (1989,153). Thus, it works against all concerned.

Having now given the philosophical groundings for a virtue ethical approach to argumentation, we are now in a position to delineate the substantive theory in as much detail as space permits.

6. The moral integrity approach

On my view, which may be called the moral integrity approach (MI), disputants are urged to pay more attention to face goals than to task goals, to moral motives than to non-moral motives. They should pursue arbitration for the sake of maintaining and developing relationships, rather than trying to determine who is objectively correct for the sake of truth, or to win the argument. MI has important implications for future research. The most urgent of these, I think, is that more work needs to be done toward developing a robust virtue ethics of argumentation. In this paper, I have urged that such an approach is warranted by the fundamental importance of “moral integrity” (Stocker), “a fully human involvement with morality” (Hare), and “aspects of one’s character” that are “related to one’s sense of self or integrity” (Kwak, 465)—features of our humanity whose centrality I have defended through illustrative examples from familiar philosophical tracts and personal experience. But I have not been able to offer a typology of the specific virtues of argumentation in the space of this paper: the task is simply too large.

However, Andrew Aberdein (2010) has made inroads in this area, including developing an agent-based account of the good arguer, defining a range of argumentative goals, and compiling a typology of argumentative virtues, such as “being communicative,” “intellectual empathy” and “fairmindedness” (p. 175). He sees these virtues as largely intuitively supported, stating that, “as far as virtue jurisprudence [i.e. one aspect of argumentational virtue] is concerned, we can do no better than to quote the notable ideal arguer Socrates, who tells his jury to ‘apply your mind to this: whether the things I say are just or not.'
For this is the virtue of a judge, while that of an orator is to speak the truth” (173). But they are also supported by reflection on the telos of argumentation: in his view, the propagation of truth, an aim that is consistent with the practical goals of “persuasion,” “resolution,” “understanding, self-knowledge, and respect” (173).

Aberdein admits that his list is not exhaustive or definitive: “doubtless further virtues may be added, and some of the classificatory assumptions may be challenged” (175); and I am not presently at liberty to undertake a critique or elaboration of his position. But I raise it as an example of the direction that needs to be taken if my defense of MI is granted credence. Given the inadequacy of the traditional Kantian outlook that favours duty above other types of motives, there is good reason to investigate a virtue ethical approach to argumentation.

There is perhaps more at stake in the development of virtue argumentation than one might realize. One of the problems concerning NLT is that it restricts “critical thinking” to a set of esoteric skills acquired in post-secondary school, and this may perpetuate the illusion that formal education is capable of insulating one from prejudice. And yet numerous preeminent scholars have endorsed extremely prejudiced views. Creating and promoting a virtue ethics of argumentation may help to dispel this delusional optimism about higher learning and Cartesian reasoning.

Secondly, NLT threatens to encourage a highly adversarial form of argumentation which is inimical to the authentic epistemic goals of argumentation, i.e. reconciliation and mutual understanding. This argumentative style could—and does—intimidate and discount people who, though they may not have impeccable logical skills, could contribute valuable insights into many subjects based on their personal experiences. For these reasons, it is crucial that scholars reevaluate the nature of critical thinking with a view to encouraging inclusivity, open-mindedness, intellectual empathy, and other argumentative virtues.

References


